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God Over All: Divine Aseity and the Challenge of Platonism , by William Lane 
Craig. Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 241. $80 (hardcover).
MARY LENG, University of York
Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics is the view that there are ab-
stract mathematical objects, such as the number 2. “Abstract,” here, is most 
often characterized by the “way of negation” (John P. Burgess and Gideon 
Rosen, A Subject with no Object: Strategies for Nominalistic Interpretation of 
Mathematics [Clarendon Press, 1997], 17), as applying to non-spatiotempo-
ral, acausal, mind- and language-independent objects. The main motivation 
for thinking that there are mathematical objects is that many mathemati-
cal claims that we take to be literally true seem to imply the existence of 
such things (for example, the claim that “There is an even prime number” 
seems to imply that there is at least one mathematical object). The main 
motivation for thinking that these objects are abstract, as negatively charac-
terized above, is that no account in terms of the obvious positive features 
seems to work. It is hard to see how the number 2 could be thought of as 
a spatiotemporally located object entering into causal relations, and, given 
the finiteness of human minds and the plausible thought that even before 
humans were on the scene to think or talk about such things, “when two 
dinosaurs met two dinosaurs there were four dinosaurs” (Martin Gard-
ner, “Is Mathematics for Real?,” New York Review of Books 28 [1981], 13), it 
is also hard to see how mathematical objects, such as numbers, could be 
dependent for their existence on human minds or languages. Mathemati-
cal truths are standardly held to be true of necessity and eternally, so the 
objects they concern should likewise exist of necessity and eternally.
However, the Platonist account of mathematical objects faces a serious 
obstacle. Precisely because of their negative characterization, it is hard for 
the Platonist to give a positive account of how we can come to know truths 
about abstract objects. Given their acausal, nonspatiotemporal, mind- and 
language-independent nature, what reason have we for thinking that our 
beliefs about abstract mathematical objects get things right about their na-
ture? This is the key epistemological challenge to Platonism, first raised by 
Paul Benacerraf (“Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 70 [1973]: 661–
680), with focus on the presumed acausal nature of mathematical objects as 
abstracta in light of the then-dominant causal theory of knowledge, and 
then refined by Hartry Field (Realism, Mathematics and Modality [Blackwell, 
1989]) as the challenge to explain how, given the Platonist’s account of the 
nature of abstract objects, it is reasonable for them to expect our mathemati-
cal beliefs reliably to reflect how things are with such objects.
In his extremely thought-provoking discussion of God and abstract ob-
jects, God Over All, William Lane Craig is concerned with another problem 




raised by the Platonist account of mathematical objects, along with other 
purported abstracta such as properties and propositions, by virtue of their 
status as abstract objects: the challenge to divine aseity. (The book, an ex-
pansion of Craig’s 2015 Cadbury Lectures, is a taster for his forthcoming 
God and Abstract Objects [Springer-Verlag], which Craig explains offers “a 
more extensive, in-depth discussion of the questions and views treated” in 
God over All [viii].) According to the Judaeo-Christian concept of God, God 
depends on no other being for His existence, whereas all other things that 
exist depend for their existence on God. If there are abstract objects, such 
as numbers, then they present a challenge to this account of the nature of 
reality. For, as Craig points out, “insofar as these abstract objects are taken 
to be uncreated, necessary, and eternal” (3), this puts them in conflict with 
the doctrine of divine aseity. As such, mathematical objects, as abstracta 
present a prima facie challenge to Judaeo-Christian theism, as do other 
purported abstracta (such as, for example, propositions or properties).
Is there room, then, for philosophers of religion concerned with the 
challenge to divine aseity, and philosophers of mathematics concerned 
with the problem of explaining our knowledge of mathematical objects 
as abstracta, to join forces in rejecting these problematic objects? That 
is Craig’s hope. In particular, in God Over All, Craig looks to contempo-
rary defences of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics to argue 
for the plausibility of avoiding the challenge to divine aseity by denying 
the existence of abstract objects. We will consider Craig’s attempt to put 
so-called “easy road” nominalist challenges to mathematical Platonism to 
the service of the theist in a moment. But first, some thoughts about the 
alternative options for the theist, which Craig considers and sets aside in 
his book.
In outlining the motivation for mathematical Platonism, above, I said 
that the characterization of mathematical objects as abstract via the “way 
of negation” had come about through the implausibility of characterizing 
such objects via any of the positive characteristics listed: spatiotemporal, 
causal, mental, linguistic. Consider in particular the thought that math-
ematical objects could be accounted for as mental objects. Constructivists 
in the philosophy of mathematics, such as L. E. J. Brouwer (“Conscious-
ness, Philosophy, and Mathematics,” [1948], extracted in Paul Benacerraf 
and Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected Readings [1983], 
90–96), attempted to account for mathematical objects as human mental 
constructions, but although the constructivist programme brought with 
it some interesting new branches of mathematics, it places strong limita-
tions on what is to count as acceptable mathematics, based on its account 
of what is constructible-in-principle by the human intellect. More broadly, 
Gottlob Frege (The Foundations of Arithmetic [1888], trans. J. L. Austin, 
2nd ed [Blackwell, 1953], 38) mocked as “weird and wonderful . . . the 
results of taking seriously the suggestion that number is an idea,” noting 
that if the number 2 is an idea in someone’s head then there would be no 
unique number 2, but just my 2, your 2, and ever more number 2s coming 
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into existence with each new generation of thinkers. But these objections 
depend on taking mathematical objects to be ideas in human minds. As 
Craig notes, if we bring a theistic outlook to the question of the nature of 
mathematical objects, the idea of mathematical objects as mental objects 
has more plausibility (72). If mathematical objects are ideas in God’s mind, 
as suggested by the doctrine of divine conceptualism, then they are not sub-
ject to the same limitations of human finite and temporally constrained 
existence. And with only one God, we can make sense of their uniqueness 
too. Furthermore, a theistic outlook may help to answer the epistemologi-
cal objection to Platonism: perhaps God is the origin of our ideas of ab-
stract objects such as numbers (something of this thought is present in 
Mark Steiner’s discussion of the puzzle of the applicability of mathematics 
[The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem (Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1998)]). The combination of realism about mathematical objects 
with theism (either by accounting for mathematical objects, as the divine 
conceptualist does, as ideas in God’s mind, or alternatively, as proposed by 
the abstract creationist, accounting for them as created abstracta), looks at 
least initially promising.
In chapters 4 and 5, Craig outlines a number of objections to abstract 
creationism and divine conceptualism, but in each case the most significant 
challenge seems to be a form of the bootstrapping objection. This objection 
arises because it is assumed that, amongst the purported abstract objects 
created by God, are properties. But, since “in order to create properties, God 
would already have to possess certain properties” (60), we appear to be 
stuck in an explanatory circle. To avoid this objection, Craig suggests that 
the only live option is to reject what he calls “the Platonistic ontological 
assay of things” (68), according to which there are properties and sub-
stances which exemplify those properties. But to drop the Platonic account 
of properties as “fundamental ontological constituents of things” (68) 
would be, Craig claims, to lose “any rationale for positing the existence—in 
a metaphysically heavy sense—of such objects” (68), thus undermining the 
motivation for accounting for abstracta as God’s creations in the first place. 
And without this motivation in place, neither divine conceptualism nor 
abstract creationism are required—we can instead move straight to nomi-
nalist attempts to do without abstracta altogether.
This move of Craig’s is, however, altogether too quick, and an apparent 
result of lumping together all purported abstracta (in this case, specifically, 
mathematical objects as abstract particulars, and properties as abstract 
universals) under one umbrella. The motivation for a Platonic account of 
properties as abstracta may well be the “Platonistic ontological assay of 
things,” according to which properties must exist metaphysically prior 
to being exemplified in substances. But the primary motivation for math-
ematical Platonism is entirely separate from the motivation for Platonism 
over nominalism as an account of universals, residing in an account of 
the semantics of claims that we take to be uncontroversially true. Aban-
don a Platonistic account of properties as universals, and the problem of 
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the apparent necessity of positing mathematical objects such as numbers 
as abstract particulars remains. But if we drop the Platonistic account of 
universals, the bootstrapping objection no longer threatens an account of 
mathematical objects as either created abstracta or divine concepts. Fur-
thermore, the abandonment of the so-called “Platonistic ontological assay 
of things” as provided by the Platonistic account of universals may actu-
ally require that we hold on to mathematical objects as abstract particulars. 
Thus, for example, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra’s defence of resemblance 
nominalism (Resemblance Nominalism: A solution to the Problem of Universals 
[Clarendon Press, 2002]) offers a nominalist account of universals as sets of 
resembling particulars, and so, at least on the face of it, requires acceptance 
of the existence of sets as abstract particulars. A rejection of the traditional 
Platonist’s abstract universals, coupled with the acceptance of realism 
about mathematical objects (as either abstract particulars or divine ideas) 
is perhaps better motivated than Craig suggests.
So it seems that, if we reject the Platonistic account of universals, real-
ism about mathematical objects as God’s creations may be pursued by the 
theist either via a defence of divine conceptualism or of absolute creation-
ism. But ought we be realists about mathematical objects? In the second 
half of his book Craig considers a version of the standard philosophical 
argument in favour of realism about mathematical objects—the so-called 
indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism—and (appealing 
to a number of recent anti-Platonist responses to this argument) finds it 
wanting. It is here where I must declare an interest, as a defender of one 
such response (Leng, Mathematics and Reality [Oxford University Press, 
2010]). So although as the above considerations indicate, I suspect that, 
if we had reason to accept the existence of mathematical objects, then this 
would not be fatal to the standard doctrine of divine aseity (since divine 
conceptualism and abstract creationism remain in play), nevertheless, I 
am broadly in agreement with Craig that the indispensability argument 
for the existence of mathematical objects can be resisted, so that we do 
not have reason to accept the existence of mathematical objects. The core 
of the response I favour is that offered by those who have come to be 
known (following Colyvan, “There is no easy road to nominalism,” Mind 
119 [2010]: 285–306) as “easy road” nominalists. Such nominalists argue 
that, while quantification over mathematical objects may turn out to be 
indispensable to our best scientific theories, nevertheless our continued 
reliance on such theories does not commit us to believe in the existence of 
mathematical objects, since it is plausible that what accounts for the suc-
cess of our scientific theories is not that those theories are literally true, but 
that they are nominalistically adequate. If we think of an empirical scientific 
theory as a body of claims apparently relating “abstract” mathematical 
objects to “concrete” physical things, the claim that empirical science is 
nominalistically adequate is roughly, as Mark Balaguer puts is, the claim 
that “the physical world holds up its end of the ‘empirical science bar-
gain’” (Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics [Oxford University 
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Press, 1998], 134)—that is, in all physical respects things are the way they 
would have to be for our theory to be true.
Craig’s discussion of such nominalist responses to the indispensability 
argument is at once intriguing and frustrating. Intriguing because, as a 
relative outsider to this debate, his focus is on issues that are often brushed 
aside in the philosophy of mathematics literature. Chapter 8, for example, 
includes an extended discussion of the question of whether fictionalism 
is self-defeating, raising the question of what attitude fictionalists should 
take to “useful fictions” themselves (an interesting issue, though one that I 
think the fictionalist has the resources to solve). Frustrating because, again 
as a relative outsider to the debate, Craig mischaracterizes a number of the 
key issues in a way that skews his response to some of the standard easy 
road positions. Most problematic in this regard is Craig’s presentation of 
the indispensability argument itself, which he takes from Mark Balaguer’s 
(2009) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “Platonism in Meta-
physics.” The argument quoted is certainly not what is standardly taken 
to be the indispensability argument for Platonism, and a quick check of 
the Stanford entry shows why: the argument quoted is what Balaguer calls 
“the singular term argument,” which he says originates with Plato but is 
first clearly formulated by Frege. The argument is roughly the one given 
at the start of this review: that there are literally true sentences whose 
truth would require the existence of abstract (mathematical) objects, so we 
should conclude that such objects would exist.
Craig singles Balaguer’s “singular term argument” out for discussion 
apparently because to his mind it presents the key issues at work in the 
indispensability argument for Platonism “free of Quine’s more controver-
sial theses” (45). But this isn’t the indispensability argument. In particular, 
the indispensability argument contains two key features that are not pres-
ent here. First is a justification for taking some claims about mathematical 
objects as literally true: this is because some such claims are indispensable 
in formulating our best empirical-scientific theories, and (according to the 
Quinean picture) we are committed to accepting those theories as true at 
least until something better comes along. Second is a focus on indispens-
able existential quantification over mathematical objects in our theories, 
rather than on the use of singular terms apparently referring to math-
ematical objects. Here, Quine is well aware that we may sometimes use 
singular terms to speak “as if” they refer to objects, without really being 
committed to the existence of such objects. The test, for Quine, for genu-
ine commitment is whether we are willing—in our most serious, literal, 
moments, i.e., in our tidied up versions of our best scientific theories—to 
“quantify in,” moving from, e.g., Fa to ∃ x F x. For Quine, the use of the 
existential quantifier in contexts where we take ourselves to be speak-
ing literally is the indicator of ontological commitment. If science (whose 
claims must be taken seriously), in its most careful moments requires ex-
istential quantification over mathematical objects, then we ought to accept 
the existence of such objects.
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The reason I bring this up is that much of Craig’s discussion of “the in-
dispensability argument” is focussed on rejecting the Quinean account of 
ontological commitment, and here much attention is paid to examples of 
uses of non-denoting singular terms in sentences that are plausibly taken 
to be literally true. Craig suggests that, rather than taking singular terms 
as automatically referring, we could adopt a positive free logic and allow 
for claims using mathematical singular terms to be literally true. This is 
the approach Craig favours, as he thinks it is implausible to claim (as I 
have done, much to Craig’s amusement (149)!) that, since “2” and “4” do 
not refer, “2 + 2 = 4” is not literally true. But, even if we allow Craig the 
use of a positive free logic and thus the literal truth of unquantified claims 
of arithmetic such as that “2 + 2 = 4,” there remains the issue that in em-
pirical science we do not restrict ourselves to unquantified arithmetic; we 
also quantify in. In positive free logic, the use of the existential quantifier 
is taken to indicate ontological commitment, so even if the unquantified 
claims of elementary arithmetic can be literally true without requiring the 
existence of mathematical objects, the mathematical claims used in em-
pirical science still does seemingly require the existence of such objects.
A further move, considered by Craig, would be to follow Jody Azzouni 
(Talking about Nothing: Numbers, Hallucinations, and Fictions [Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010]) in denying that even the existential quantifier is 
indicative of ontological commitment. Craig has some sympathies to-
wards this position, but ultimately pulls back from endorsing Azzouni’s 
view wholesale. Instead, following Theodore Sider (Writing the Book of the 
World [Oxford University Press, 2011]), he claims that, while most ordi-
nary uses of the existential quantifier are not ontologically committing, 
we can introduce a new language, Ontologese, whose quantifiers are stipu-
lated as indicative of ontological commitments, and argues that we should 
use this language when we are presenting our most serious metaphysical 
claims about the nature of reality. Craig thus endorses a positive free logic 
as the proper logic of Ontologese, suggesting that when we are presenting 
our most serious metaphysical account of reality existential quantifiers, 
but not singular terms, should be read as indicative of commitment to the 
existence of objects.
Again, this is all very well and good, but, in light of the Quinean theses 
mentioned above, this makes clear how close Craig’s position on ontologi-
cal commitment is, in fact, to Quine’s. In both cases, it is existential quan-
tification, rather than the mere use of singular terms, that is indicative 
of genuine ontological commitment, and, in both cases, even existential 
quantifiers are only indicative of genuine ontological commitment when 
we are speaking seriously and literally about ontological matters. All Quine adds 
to this is the claim that empirical science (rather than, e.g., the metaphysics 
classroom) provides the context where we speak seriously and literally 
about ontological matters: if we are aiming to carve nature at its joints, 
Quine says we can do no better than trust what our scientific theories say 
about how to do so.
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Despite, then, Craig’s efforts to challenge the Quinean account of on-
tological commitment assumed by myself and others in the debate over 
the indispensability argument, what is really required for his response to 
Quine to work is for him either to show that we can dispense with quan-
tification over mathematical objects in our best scientific theories (this is 
Field’s hard road to nominalism; Science without Numbers [Princeton, 1980]), 
or to make plausible the claim that we need not—and ought not—take 
seriously all the claims of even our best scientific theories (this is the easy 
road offered, in various ways, by myself, Jody Azzouni [Deflating Existen-
tial Consequence: A Case for Nominalism (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
Mark Balaguer, [Platonism and Anti-Platonism in Mathematics]; Stephen 
Yablo [“The Myth of the Seven,” in Mark Eli Kalderon, ed., Fictionalism in 
Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2005), 88–115], and others). Craig 
throws himself in with the easy road camp, and of course I am with him in 
thinking that this approach can be made to work, but again lack of engage-
ment with the Quinean case for taking empirical science as the arena in 
which ontological matters are settled means that some of Craig’s defences 
of the “easy road” approaches seem beside the point. Thus, for example, 
chapter 10 includes a very nice discussion of features of pure mathematics 
that make it apt for a ‘make-believe’ account, but the Quinean could con-
cede all of that and argue that nevertheless, once mathematical theories 
make their way into empirical science, they get confirmed as literally true. 
Even as a reader whose sympathies lie firmly with easy road nominal-
ism, then, I was left with the feeling that, while Craig’s thinking is along 
the right lines in endorsing a nominalist approach in the philosophy of 
mathematics, nevertheless he has not quite appreciated the strength of the 
case against.
In relation to the case against nominalism, I would like finally to note a 
feature of nominalist approaches in the philosophy of mathematics, both 
in the “easy road” and the “hard road” camp, that is overlooked by Craig, 
and that has led some to question how much is actually gained by the 
nominalist rejection of the Platonist’s abstract objects. In almost all cases 
(with, perhaps, Weir (Truth through Proof [Oxford University Press, 2010]) 
as a notable exception), nominalists in the philosophy of mathematics 
propose to do without abstract mathematical objects by means of a trade 
of ontology for modality. Thus, for fictionalists both of the easy road and 
hard road stripe, what is fictional in a given pure mathematical theory is 
its axioms and their logical consequences. And again, in the case of ap-
plied mathematics, the nominalistic adequacy of a mathematically-stated 
empirical theory is a matter of it being consistent with any nominalistic 
facts, and thus logically implying no false nominalistic claims. Indeed, 
Craig’s concern about the potential “self-defeating” nature of fictionalism 
is answerable once we introduce a modal element (Craig touches on this 
when he suggests that “reference to stories, theories, models, and the like” 
can be dispensed with in the fictionalist account in favour of “counter-
factual claims about what mathematical entities would be like were they 
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to exist” [165]). Acceptance of primitive modal facts about logical conse-
quence allows the fictionalist to make good on such “counterfactuals”: 
they are, strictly, claims about what follows logically from the assumption 
that there are objects satisfying a given theory’s axioms. Fictionalist (and 
related nominalist) accounts in the philosophy of mathematics are heav-
ily reliant on the assumption that there are primitive (unreduced) modal 
facts about what follows from what, and that we can come to know some 
such facts.
In the context of the philosophy of mathematics, where the standard 
challenge for Platonism is the “knowledge problem,” those in the Platonist 
camp may reasonably question whether anything has been achieved by 
this attempt to do away with a problematic ontology by trading ontology 
for modality. By introducing primitive modal facts, perhaps the nominalist 
has just replaced one mystery (how we can come to know abstract objects) 
with another (how we can come to know facts about what follows from 
what)? On the other hand, the Platonist will claim, if we equip ourselves 
with abstract mathematical objects, then we can do away with mysteri-
ous primitive modal facts. Once we have the set theoretic universe, then 
model theory provides us with a reductive account of modal truths as 
truths about set theoretic models (though see Shalkowski [“The Ontologi-
cal Ground of the Alethic Modality,” The Philosophical Review103 (1994): 
669–688] for a dissenting voice about the prospects of reductive accounts 
of modality). If we shift this debate to the philosophy of religion, analo-
gous worries may appear relating to Craig’s attempt to bypass the chal-
lenge to divine aseity by doing away with abstract objects. If the rejection 
of abstract objects requires the acceptance of primitive modal facts, then 
one wonders whether the challenge of divine aseity is avoided only at the 
cost of reintroducing the challenge of divine sovereignty.
Craig takes pains in chapter 4 to distinguish between Platonism’s chal-
lenge to divine aseity and its challenge to divine sovereignty, while noting 
that the two are often run together. Craig’s interest is in the challenge to 
divine aseity, so he largely sets the sovereignty issue aside. But the sub-
stantial modal assumptions made by nominalists in the hope of avoiding 
abstracta bring the challenge of divine sovereignty to front of stage. If the 
rejection of abstract objects requires the acceptance of primitive modal 
facts governing what would have to be true were there objects satisfy-
ing our mathematical axioms, then the question arises as to whether God 
has sovereignty over these facts. This is not to say that the challenge of 
modal facts to divine sovereignty is as pressing as the challenge of abstract 
objects to divine aseity, but just to note that the nominalist proposal to 
do away with abstract objects in the philosophy of mathematics does not 
come for free, and that the resulting modal commitments may bring with 
them problems of their own. Despite Craig’s best efforts to avoid the issue 
of divine sovereignty in this book, then, the completion of his proposed 
solution to the problem of divine aseity may well require some with sub-
stantial further work to be done on this topic.
